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 Abstract  
The “sub-prime” crisis, which led to major turbulence in global financial markets beginning in 
mid-2007, has posed major challenges for monetary policymakers.  We analyse the impact on 
monetary policy of the widening differential between policy rates and the 3-month Libor rate, 
the benchmark for private sector interest rates.  We show that the optimal monetary policy 
rule should include the determinants of this differential, adding an extra layer of complexity to 
the problems facing policymakers.  Our estimates reveal significant effects of risk and liquidity 
measures, suggesting the widening differential between base rates and Libor was largely 
driven by a sharp increase in unsecured lending risk.  We calculate that the crisis increased 
libor by up to 60 basis points; in response base rates fell further and quicker than would 
otherwise have happened as policymakers sought to offset some of the contractionary effects 
of the sub-prime crisis.   
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1) Introduction 
 
The “sub-prime” crisis, which led to major turbulence in global financial 
markets beginning in mid-2007, has posed major challenges for monetary 
policymakers.  Most prominence has been given to the attempts by 
policymakers to avoid systemic failures in financial institutions by means of 
liquidity injections and proposed regulatory reforms.  But the crisis also posed 
new problems for policymakers in setting interest rates in order to steer the 
economy towards stable inflation and output levels.  One of the main 
symptoms of the sub-prime crisis has been the widening differential between 
medium-term interest rates such as the 3-month Libor rate and the short-term 
base rate set by policymakers.  This differential is important since aggregate 
demand is more responsive to the Libor rate than to the base rate as it is the 
benchmark interest rate that influences the interest rate at which the private 
sector, both corporate and personal, can borrow.  A changing relationship 
between base and Libor rates implies that a given base rate implies a different 
level of aggregate demand and hence different levels of inflation and output.  
This added an extra layer of complexity to the problems facing policymakers.
 This paper analyses the effects of this changing relationship on the 
behaviour of monetary policymakers in the UK.  We begin by extending a 
prominent model of optimal monetary policy to introduce the distinction 
between the interest rate set by the policymaker and the interest rate that 
affects aggregate demand, something that is neglected by existing models.  
Doing so, we obtain an optimal monetary policy rule for the base rate that 
includes not just inflation and the output gap but also the determinants of the 
differential between the base rate and the rate at which the private sector can 
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borrow.  The emerging literature on the sub-prime crisis has identified risk and 
liquidity factors as being central to the changing relationship between Libor 
and the base rate; our model implies that these factors should also be 
components of the optimal policy rule.   The augmented policy rule suggests 
two new insights into monetary policy; first, a rising differential implies that the 
level of aggregate demand can contract even if the base rate is constant or 
even falling, a situation that arguably occurred in the UK in early 2008 (e.g. 
Lomax, 2007).  This also implies that in the medium-term a higher differential 
between Libor and base rates will imply lower base rates on average (Smith, 
2007).  Second, any factor that affects the slope of the relationship between 
the base rate and Libor will affect the optimal response of interest rates to 
inflation and output.  For example, we shall argue below that a deterioration in 
market liquidity after mid-2007 made base rates more responsive to inflation 
and output. 
We estimate an empirical version of the monetary policy rule, 
augmented by an equation for the yield curve relationship between base rates 
and Libor.  We use monthly data as the interest rate-setting Monetary Policy 
Committee meets monthly.  For inflation, we use the rate targeted by the 
MPC, the annual change in the Retail Price Index excluding mortgage interest 
payments (RPIX) until December 2003 and the annual change in the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) thereafter.  Correspondingly, the inflation target 
is 2.5% until December 2003 and 2% thereafter.  For output we use monthly 
GDP data.  Following the literature on the sub-prime crisis (e.g. Michaud and 
Upper, 2008, and Taylor and Williams, 2008), we use the difference between 
rates on secured and unsecured borrowing in the inter-bank market as our 
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main measure of risk in the relationship between the 3-month Libor rate and 
the base rate.  This has been used to capture the perceived risk in lending 
between banks when there is concern that the counter-party may default, a 
prominent issue during the crisis.  For liquidity, we use the composite index 
published in the bi-annual Financial Stability Report.  This index reflects bid-
ask spreads, return-to-volume ratios and liquidity premia using data for the 
US, Eurozone and the UK.  For further details, see Bank of England (2007).    
 We find considerable empirical support for our model; the exclusion of 
risk and liquidity measures from the policy rule is rejected as is the 
assumption of a constant response of interest rates to inflation and output. 
Unsecured lending risk and liquidity are significant determinants of the 
differential between base and Libor rates; however the increase in the 
differential since mid-2007 is largely driven by increases in unsecured lending 
risk.  Our evidence therefore further supports the argument that the sub-prime 
crisis was largely the result of the unwillingness of banks to enter the inter-
bank market because of uncertainty of the value of assets on offer and, at 
times, because of fears of the solvency of their counter-parties. 
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  The theoretical 
model is developed in section 2).  Section 3) describes the variables used in 
our empirical model.  Section 4) contains our estimates.  Section 5) 
concludes. 
 
2) Theory 
We use a slightly-modified version of the canonical model of Svensson (1997) 
in which a standard Taylor rule emerges as the result of a theoretical 
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framework in which policymakers adjust interest rates in order to pursue an 
inflation target.  The model is  
  
(1) 1 1t t y t typi pi α υ+ += + +  
 
(2)  1 1 1( )
borrow
t y t r t t t t ty y E i E rβ α pi η+ + += − − − +  
 
(3)  0 1
borrow base
t t t t ti iω ω ε= + +    
 
Equation (1) is a Phillips curve in which inflation depend on inflation and the 
output gap in the previous period and on a supply shock (υ ).  Equation (2) is 
an aggregate demand relationship in which the output gap ( y ) depends on 
the lagged output gap, the real interest rate at which the private sector can 
borrow relative to its’ equilibrium value and on a demand shock (η ).  This 
differs from the standard formulation in using the nominal interest rate at 
which the private sector can borrow (
borrowi ) rather than the base rate (
basei ).  
Since the borrowing rate is closely linked to medium-term interest rates, most 
prominently the 3-month Libor rate, equation (3) relates the nominal borrowing 
rate to the base rate using a yield-curve relationship.  We allow both the 
intercept and slope of this relationship to vary over time, to reflect the 
pronounced movements in the differential between medium-term rates and 
base rates that have been observed since mid-2007.    
The model is a simple extension of Svensson (1997), which is obtained 
if 
borrow base
t ti i= .  To solve for the optimal policy rule we follow the approach 
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Svensson.  We assume that at time t  policymakers choose current and future 
base rates to minimise the loss function   
 
(4)  
2
0
1
{ ( ) }
2
i T
t t t i
i
L E δ pi pi
∞
+
=
= −∑  
 
Equation (4) specifies the policymakers’ loss function as the discounted sum 
of expected quadratic deviations of inflation pi  from the inflation target Tpi ,  
where δ  is the discount factor.  We assume policymakers know the value of 
tε  but not the other errors, which become apparent at the end of the period.   
Since the base rate chosen at time t affects the inflation rate in only period, 
that two periods ahead, the policymakers’ problem is equivalent to minimising 
2 2
2
1
( )
2
T
t t tL Eδ pi pi+= − .  The first-order condition is
1  
 
(5)  1 2
T
t tE pi pi− + =  
 
where we assume that policymakers choose interest rates at the start of 
period t based on information available up to the end of period t-1.  Using (1)-
(3), we can express the optimal policy rule as 
  
(6) 
0
1 1 1
1 1
ˆ ( )
T
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t t t t t
t t r y t r
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i E E y
α α β α αpi ω
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ω ω α α ω α
+ + ++ −
= + − +  
 
                                                 
1
  This argument closely follows Svennson (1997); see equation 2.8) of that paper and 
the preceding discussion for a more extensive analysis. 
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This extends the familiar Taylor rule by including the yield curve factors, 0tω  
and 1tω .   Intuitively, because aggregate demand and inflation depend on the 
borrowing rate, the optimal base rate will be a function of factors that affect 
the relationship between the base rate and the borrowing rate.  The inclusion 
of these factors is consistent with evidence that inclusion of yield curve 
determinants improves the performance of Taylor rules in the US (e.g. 
Piazzesi, 2005).   
 
3) Empirical Specification 
 In this section we develop an estimable model consisting of empirical 
versions of the yield curve relationship in (3) and the optimal policy rule in (6).  
Beginning with the yield curve relationship, the recent literature on the “sub-
prime crisis” of 2007-2008 has focused on the widening differential between 
overnight and medium-term rates.  Using daily data, Michaud and Upper 
(2008) consider the differential between the overnight indexed swap (OIS) 
rate and the 3-month LIBOR rate and investigate the role of risk and liquidity 
factors in explaining the widening of this differential from mid-2007.  They 
consider two measures of risk, the spread between secured and unsecured 
inter-bank rates and premia on credit default swaps and argue that 
movements in the secured-unsecured spread are more closely related to 
movements in the OIS-Libor differential.  Liquidity is measured using 
indicators of trading volume, bid-ask spreads and the impact of trades on 
prices, derived using data from the e-MID electronic trading platform.  These 
measures have no clear relationship with movements in the Libor-base rate 
spread.    
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 Taylor and Williams (2008) mainly consider the US and also use daily 
data.  They focus on the role of risk factors in explaining the spread between 
1- and 3-month interbank rates and OIS rates.  As with Michaud and Upper 
(2008), risk is measured credit default swap premia and the spread between 
secured and unsecured inter-bank rates, although the former measure is 
preferred as a less noisy measure of risk.  The effects of liquidity are confined 
to allowing for effects of the Term Auction Facility (TAF) introduced in 
December 2007.  Both measures of risk and the effects of the TAF are 
significant in regressions explaining both the 1- and 3-month spreads.   
 Our econometric model will further test some of these ideas and 
integrate them into a model that also allows us to analyse the response of 
monetary policymakers to the “sub-prime crisis”.  We use monthly data since 
the Monetary Policy Committee meets monthly.  This forces us to use 
somewhat different explanatory variables than in the recent literature.  We use 
the base rate rather than the overnight indexed swap rate as this is the rate 
directly set by the monetary policy committee and since the OIS rate is only 
available for a relatively short period of time. In practice this has little effect; 
for the period for which they are available monthly OIS rates are highly 
correlated with the base rate.  We are also unable to use credit default swap 
premia as data on these are only available from mid-2004 and so use the 
spread between secured and unsecured inter-bank rates as our main 
measure of risk.  
To capture liquidity effects2 we use the index of liquidity calculated by 
the Bank of England; unlike data from the e-MID platform, this is available on 
                                                 
2
  For more detailed analyses of the impact of liquidity, see papers by Goodhart, 
Crocker and Tirole in Banque de France (2008).  
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a monthly basis since 1992.  This index reflects three factors: bid-ask spreads 
(for Gilt Repos, the FTSE100 and major currencies) as a measure of the 
“tightness” of markets (Kyle, 1985); the return-to-volume ratio (for Gilts, the 
FTSE100 and equity options) as a measure of the impact of volumes of prices 
(Amihud, 2002); and liquidity premia, measured as the spread between 
corporate bonds and a credit spread and between bond and Libor rates in the 
US, Eurozone and the UK.  For further details, see Bank of England (2007)  
 On the basis of this discussion the empirical version of the yield curve 
equation in (3) is  
 
(7) 
,3 ,1 ,1 ,3 ,1
00 01 02 03 11 12( ) ( ) ( )
lib lib repo repo repo FSR FSR base
t t t t t t t t ti i i i i liq liq iω ω ω ω ω ω ε= + − + − + + + +  
 
Comparing (7) with (3)3, 
,1 ,1 ,3 ,1
0 0 01 02 03( ) ( )
lib repo repo repo FSR
t t t t t ti i i i liqω ω ω ω ω= + − + − +   
and 1 11 12
FSR
t tliqω ω ω= + .   
,3lib
ti  is the average 3-month Libor rate. 
,1 ,1( )lib repot ti i−  is 
the differential between 1-month Libor and Gilt-Repo rates.  This measures 
the differential between unsecured and secured lending rates4.  We also 
include the differential between the 3-month Libor and 1-month Gilt Repo 
rates to capture term structure effects. 
FSRliq  is the liquidity index published by 
the Bank of England in the Financial Stability Report.  We include an 
interaction term, whereby the effect of liquidity on 
,3( )lib baset ti i−  varies with the 
base rate, to allow for changes in the slope of the yield curve.  
                                                 
3
   The interest rates in (7) are monthly averages of daily observations, obtained from 
the Bank of England website. 
4
  Borrowing on the LIBOR market is unsecured while borrowing on the Gilt Repo rate 
market is secured. 
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 For the optimal policy rule in (6), the main modelling choices are how to 
interpret the timing of events and which measures of inflation and the output 
gap to use.  In our preferred specification, policymakers respond to forecasts 
of inflation and the output gap over the coming three months.   Although this 
may appear to conflict with the specification of the optimal policy rule in (6), it 
has been argued that policymakers in effect review decisions every three 
months as forecasts of inflation, output and the time profile of interest rates 
are updated in the quarterly Inflation Report.   Using (7) to express 0tω  and 
1tω  in terms of risk and liquidity factors, our empirical policy rule is then 
 
(8)  
,1 ,1 ,3 ,1
00 01 02 03
11 12
2 2
0 011 12 11 12
( ) ( )ˆ
( )
T lib repo repo repo FSR
base t t t t t
t FSR
t
yT
t k t k tFSR FSR
k kt t
r i i i i liq
i
liq
y
liq liq
pi
pi ω ω ω ω
ω ω
φφ
pi pi ζ
ω ω ω ω
+ +
= =
+ − − − − − −
=
+
+ − + +
+ +
∑ ∑
 
 
where 
1 r y
r y
pi
α α
φ
α α
+
= , 
1 y r y
y
r
β α α
φ
α
+ +
=  and the error term reflects the errors 
induced by replacing expected values of inflation and the output gap with the 
realised ex-post values.   We use the inflation rate targeted by monetary 
policy, namely the annual change in the RPIX price index until December 
2003 and the annual change in the CPI thereafter.  Correspondingly, the 
inflation target is 2.5% until December 2003 and 2% thereafter.  For output we 
use monthly GDP data (kindly provided by the National Institute of Economics 
and Social Research) and derive the output gap as the proportional difference 
between GDP and its’ Hodrick-Prescott trend.    Finally, we allow for the 
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effects of interest rate smoothing5 by expressing the observed base rate as a 
weighted average of the current optimal and previous base rates:  
 
(9)  1
ˆ(1 )base base baset t ti i iρ ρ−= + −  
 
where 
basei  is the observed base rate and the optimal base rate, ˆ
basei  , is given 
by (8).   Combining (8) and (9),  
 
(10)
,1 ,1 ,3 ,1
00 01 02 03
1
11 12
2 2
0 011 12 11 12
( ) ( )
(1 ){
( ) }
T lib repo repo repo FSR
base base t t t t t
t t FSR
t
yT
t k t k tFSR FSR
k kt t
r i i i i liq
i i
liq
y
liq liq
pi
pi ω ω ω ω
ρ ρ
ω ω
φφ
pi pi ζ
ω ω ω ω
−
+ +
= =
+ − − − − − −
= + −
+
+ − + +
+ +
∑ ∑
 
 
Our empirical model comprises equations (7) and (10). 
 There are two sets of testable restrictions that simplify our model to 
models estimated elsewhere in the literature.  First, the yield curve model in 
(7) simplifies to models estimated in the existing literature if 11 1ω =  and 
12 0ω = , in which case  
 
(11) 
,3 ,1 ,1 ,3 ,1
00 01 02 03( ) ( )
lib base lib repo repo repo FSR
t t t t t t t ti i i i i i liqω ω ω ω ε− = + − + − + +  
 
This simplified model for the Libor-base rate differential is similar to the model 
in Michaud and Upper (2008) for the Libor-OIS differential, where, as they 
                                                 
5
  Interest rate smoothing is difficult to model in the context of the Svensson approach 
to deriving the optimal monetary policy rule.  As an alternative approach, we could derive the 
optimal policy rule from an amended model in which the loss function has quadratic terms in 
inflation, output and interest rate changes.  The resultant rule would be similar to (6) above 
but with an interest rate smoothing term. 
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discuss, variations in liquidity between financial institutions and market 
microstructure effects are captured in the error term.  Although the theoretical 
framework in Taylor and Williams (2008), based on the Ang and Piazzesi 
(2003) model of the term structure, is rather different, the model they estimate 
is consistent with (11).  With these restrictions, (10) simplifies to  
 
(12) 
,1 ,1 ,3 ,1
1 00 01 02
2 2
03
0 0
(1 ){ ( ) ( )
( ) }
base base T lib repo repo repo
t t t t t t
FSR T
t t k y t k t
k k
i i r i i i i
liq ypi
ρ ρ pi ω ω ω
ω φ pi pi φ ζ
−
+ +
= =
= + − + − − − − −
− + − + +∑ ∑
 
 
In this policy rule, risk and liquidity continue to affect base rates but the 
optimal response to inflation and output is now independent of these factors.  
 A second simplified model is obtained if 01 02 03 12 0ω ω ω ω= = = = , in 
which case our model simplifies to 
 
(13)  
,3
00
lib base
t t ti i ω ε− = +  
and 
(14)  
2 2
1 00
0 0
(1 ){ ( ) }base base T Tt t t k y t k t
k k
i i r ypiρ ρ pi ω φ pi pi φ ζ− + +
= =
= + − + − + − + +∑ ∑  
 
In this case there is a fixed proportional relationship between the Libor and 
base rates and our policy rule simplifies to the familiar Taylor rule. 
 Our empirical strategy will be to compare estimates of the system 
comprising (7) and (10) with the simplified models in (11)-(12) and (13)-(14).  
We also note that the model in (7) and (10) implies that estimates of each of 
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(11)-(14) will suffer from parameter instability.  We will use this as an 
additional test of the specification of our model. 
 The main features of our data are depicted in figure 1).  Figure a) 
shows the differential between the 3-month Libor and base rates; this exhibits 
a sharp increase in mid 2007, followed by fluctuations around an elevated 
level until the end of our sample.  Figure 1b) shows 
,1 ,1( )lib repot ti i− , where we 
see a sharp jump in mid 2007 that matches the sharp rise in 
,3( )lib baset ti i− .  
Movements in 
,3 ,1( )repo repot ti i− , depicted in figure 1c), are less dramatic and are 
less correlated with 
,3( )lib baset ti i− .  Movements in this liquidity index are 
depicted in figure 1d), where it is apparent that liquidity fell sharply in mid-
2007 having increased steadily over the previous five years6.  Figures 1e) and 
1f) depict the inflation rate relative to the target and the output gap. 
  
4) Estimates 
Our main estimates are presented in table 1).  We estimated our system using 
GMM.  We treat all variables as endogenous, using the first four lags of each 
as instruments.  Column (i) presents estimates of (7) and (10), column (ii) has 
estimates of (11)-(12) while column (iii) has estimates of (13)-(14).  There is 
considerable support for our model in equations (7) and (10).  We reject 
01 02 03 12 0ω ω ω ω= = = = , which simplify the model to that in column (ii) and 
reject 11 1ω =  and 12 0ω = , which simplify the model to that in column (iii).  We 
                                                 
6
  The index is expressed in standardised form, relative to the mean value of the mid-
1990s and where the vertical scale measures deviations in terms of standard deviations; data 
on the liquidity index are available since 1992, whereas data on the Libor and Repo rates are 
only available since 1996. 
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also find parameter instability on each of (11)-(14), which further supports our 
preferred specification.   
The estimated parameters of our preferred model are all significant and 
of the expected sign (this is not true of the simplified model in (11)-(12)).  In 
the policy rule, the responses of interest rates to inflation and output are 
comparable to those estimated in the existing literature, although the 
estimated equilibrium real interest rate is perhaps a little low.   In the Libor 
equation, increases in unsecured lending risk and medium term risk are 
associated with a larger differential.  Liquidity has two, off-setting, effects on 
the differential between Libor and the base rate; an increase in liquidity 
reduces the differential, via the negative estimate on 03ω , but also increases it 
via the positive estimate 12ω . 
 Our estimates imply a more complex policy rule than usually 
considered, including measures of the risk and liquidity that affect the 
relationship between the base rate set by policymakers and rate at which he 
private sector can borrow.  To illustrate this, we conducted a simple 
counterfactual analysis, by calculating the implied predicted value of the base 
rate assuming that our risk and liquidity measures were fixed at their 2007Q1 
values for the remainder of our sample7.  As figure 2) shows, base rates 
would have risen by 50 basis points in response to rising inflation in the spring 
in 2007 before falling by 25 basis points late in the year.  With risk and 
liquidity factors unchanged, movements in the 3-month libor rate would have 
mirrored these changes.  The impact of increasing risk and deteriorating 
market liquidity is apparent in the divergence between the actual and 
                                                 
7
  We use realised values of inflation and output; this can of course only be justified in 
the very short run and in the context of a limited illustration of the implications of our results.  
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counterfactual libor rates, leading to an additional increase of up to 60 basis 
points in the libor rate, representing a sharp tightening in monetary policy in 
the summer and autumn of 2007.  The impact of risk and liquidity on the base 
rate is also apparent; the base rate was cut by 25 basis points in December 
2007 compared to a counterfactual cut in January 2008, and the further 25 
basis point reduction in February 2008 is not predicted by this counterfactual 
experiment.  This illustrates the impact of the sub-prime crisis on monetary 
policy, both in terms of increasing the libor rate relative to the base base rate 
and in terms of lowering the base rate itself.  The impact of the sub-prime 
crisis on the response of interest rates to inflation and output is depicted in 
figure 3); this shows the expansion in liquidity in the early year of this century 
reduced these responses, which then returned to the higher levels of the late 
1990s following the sharp deterioration in liquidity in 2007-8.  
 Our estimates suggest that the key indicator of the “sub-prime” crisis, 
the rise in the differential between Libor and base rates, is largely explained 
by increases in unsecured lending risk.  Figure 4) shows the results of using 
our model to decompose the rise in this differential since July 2007 (this is 
also discussed in the Appendix).  The offsetting effects of liquidity largely 
cancel themselves out, while, as expected, the yield curve effects of the 
differential between the 3- and 1-month Gilt repo rates are small.  The effect 
of the increase in the differential between 1-month Libor and Gilt Repo rates is 
dominant.   These estimates support the view that the rise in the perceived 
risk of unsecured lending on the inter-bank market was the main driving force 
behind the sub-prime crisis.   
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 The remainder of the paper considers the robustness of our findings.  
First, we use the differential between corporate bonds and 10-government 
bonds, both to assess this alternative measure of risk and to assess the 
effects of a longer sample, since we have data on this from 1992.  We amend 
our model to be: 
 
(15)   
,3
00 03 04 11 12( ) ( )
lib FSR corp gb FSR base
t t t t t t ti liq i i liq iω ω ω ω ω ε= + + − + + +  
 
(16)  
00 03 04
1
11 12
2 2
0 011 12 11 12
( )
(1 ){
( ) }
T FSR corp gb
base base t t t
t t FSR
t
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t k t k tFSR FSR
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r liq i i
i i
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y
liq liq
pi
pi ω ω ω
ρ ρ
ω ω
φφ
pi pi ζ
ω ω ω ω
−
+ +
= =
+ − − − −
= + −
+
+ − + +
+ +
∑ ∑
 
 
where 
corpi  is the corporate bond rate and 
gb
ti  is the 10-year government bond 
rate.   Estimates of this model, presented in column (iv) of table 1) are similar 
to those in column (i).  The restrictions that would simplify this model to (11)-
(12) or (13)-(14) are again rejected.  Second, we use the overnight interest 
rate swap rate in place of the base rate.  The model in this case is 
  
 
(17)   
,3 ,3 ,1
00 02 03 11 12( ) ( )
lib repo repo FSR FSR ois
t t t t t t ti i i liq liq iω ω ω ω ω ε= + − + + + +  
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where 
oisi  is the monthly average overnight interest rate swap rate.   We are 
limited by lack of data here, since data on OIS rates are only available from 
late 2000.  This seems to have particularly affected the estimates on the 
inflation term in the policy rule and on medium term risk in the Libor equation.  
This aside, the main features of our estimates are unchanged and we are 
unable to simplify to either (11)-(12) or (13)-(14).   
We also tried estimating (7)-(10) using the inflation forecasts provided 
by the Bank’s Inflation Report and using real time data on output.  These 
experiments are hampered by the fact that inflation forecasts and real time 
data are only available on a quarterly frequency; to overcome this we 
assumed a constant inflation forecast for each month within the same quarter 
and a constant growth rate of real-time output data within a quarter . Doing so 
makes no qualitative difference to our empirical results, although estimates of 
the policy rule become less reliable.  Estimates of models which used 
alternative filters to de-trend output data were similar to those reported in 
table 1). 
 Finally, we note that our estimates suffer from some residual ARCH 
effects, which seem to be associated with the liquidity measure, which is 
highly volatile towards the end of the sample.  Estimating (7) and (10) with a 
correction for these ARCH effects has little effect on the estimates.  
Alternatively, we obtain a model free of ARCH effects if the liquidity variable is 
dropped from the model, estimates of the other parameters being relatively 
unaffected.  We prefer not to omit liquidity effects as these are important 
factors in the sub-prime crisis. 
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5) Conclusions 
We have analysed the impact of the sub-prime crisis which began in mid-2007 
on the interest rate-setting behaviour of UK monetary policymakers.  Our 
focus is on the widening differential between base rates and the 3-month 
Libor rate, the latter being a key determinant of aggregate demand as it is the 
baseline against which many interest rates relevant to the private sector are 
set.  In order to do so, we extend a familiar model of optimal monetary policy, 
due to Svensson (1997) to allow for the distinction between the interest rate 
set by the Central Bank and the interest rate relevant to private sector 
expenditure decisions.   We show that the resulting optimal policy rule 
includes the determinants of the differential between the two interest rates 
and that factors which affect the slope of the relationship between the interest 
rates affect the optimal response of interest rates to inflation and output.  
 We estimate our model using UK data using the 3-month Libor rate to 
measure the interest rate relevant to aggregate demand and following the 
literature on the “sub-prime” crisis in using measures of risk and liquidity as 
determinants of the differential between this and the base rate.  Our estimates 
support our model.  We find strong effects from both unsecured lending risk, 
measured by the difference between the 1-month Libor and Gilt repo rates, 
and liquidity; exclusion of these factors from the policy rule is strongly rejected 
by the data.  We use our model to investigate the effects of the sub-prime 
crisis.  We calculate that the effects of the sub-prime crisis increased the 3-
month libor rate by up to 60 basis points in the summer and autumn of 2007, 
representing a significant tightening in monetary policy.  They also affected 
the base rate, which fell further and quicker than would otherwise have 
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happened as policymakers sought to offset some of the contractionary effects 
of the sub-prime crisis on aggregate demand.  We also establish that the rise 
in the differential between the 3-month libor rate and base rates was largely 
driven by unsecured lending risk, supporting the view that the perceived risk 
of unsecured lending on the inter-bank market was the main driving force 
behind the sub-prime crisis, perhaps because of the unwillingness of banks to 
enter the inter-bank market in view of the uncertain value of the assets on 
offer and fears of the solvency of counter-parties. 
 Although suggestive, our work is necessarily preliminary as the sub-
prime crisis is still ongoing at the time of writing, in summer 2008.  A more 
definitive analysis must wait for the end of the crisis and for its 
macroeconomics effects to have unwound.  We intend to return to this in 
future work. 
 
 21 
Appendix: Decomposing changes in the relationship between the 
borrowing rate and the base rate 
 
The relationship between the borrowing rate and the base rate is 
 
0 1
borrow base
t t t ti iω ω= +         (A1) 
 
So the differential between the borrowing rate and base rate is 
 
0 1
borrow base base base
t t t t t t tdiff i i i iω ω= − = + −      (A2) 
 
where 
,1 ,1 ,3 ,1
0 0 01 02 03( ) ( )
lib repo repo repo FSR
t t t t t ti i i i liqω ω ω ω ω= + − + − +  and 
1 11 12
FSR
t tliqω ω ω= + . 
 
The impact of a change in a variable x on the differential is then 
 
0 1
base base
borrow baset t t t t
t t
t t t t
diff i i
i i
x x x x
ω ω∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= − = + −
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
    (A3) 
 
Since 
 
2 2
1 1 0
0 0
(1 ){ ( ) }base T Tt t t t t k y t k
k k
i i r ypiω ρ ρ pi ω φ pi pi φ− + +
= =
= + − + − + − +∑ ∑   (A4) 
 
then 
 
1 0(1 )
base
t t t
t t
i
x x
ω ω
ρ
∂ ∂
= − −
∂ ∂
       (A5) 
 
Also since 
 
2 2
0
1
0 01 1 1 1
(1 ){ ( ) }
T
ybase Tt
t t t k t k
k kt t t t
r
i i ypi
φpi ω φρ
ρ pi pi
ω ω ω ω
− + +
= =
+ −
= + − + − +∑ ∑  
 
then  
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0 0 1 1
12 2
1 1 1
2
1 1
2 2
01 1
2
1
2
01
1
(1 )( )
1 1
(1 )( )( ) (1 )( ) ( )
1
(1 )( ) }
base
t t t t t
t
t t t t t t t
T Tt t
t k
kt t t t
t
y t k
kt t
i
i
x x x x
r
x x
y
x
pi
ω ω ω ωρ
ρ
ω ω ω
ω ω
ρ pi ρ φ pi pi
ω ω
ω
ρ φ
ω
−
+
=
+
=
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= − − − −
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂
− − + − − −
∂ ∂
∂
− −
∂
∑
∑
 
 
which simplifies to  
 
0 1
1 1
1
(1 )
base base
t t t t
t t t t t
i i
x x x
ω ω
ρ
ω ω
∂ ∂ ∂
= − − −
∂ ∂ ∂
      (A6) 
 
Combining (A3)-(A6),  
 
0 1
1 1
1
( )
base
t t t t
t t t t t
diff i
x x x
ω ωρ
ρ
ω ω
∂ ∂ ∂−
= + +
∂ ∂ ∂
      (A7) 
 
Next we calculate individual effects. 
 
1. Unsecured lending risk 
,1 ,1( )lib repot ti i−  
 
0 1.68t
tx
ω∂
=
∂
8 and 
1 0t
tx
ω∂
=
∂
 
 
Therefore 
 
,1 ,1
1
1
1.688( )
( )
t
lib repo
t t t
diff
i i
ρ
ρ
ω
∂ −
= +
∂ −  
 
so change due to changes in unsecured lending risk is    
 
1.688
1
1
( )
t
ρ
ρ
ω
−
+ ,1 ,1 ,1 ,1
2007 2007{( ) ( )}
lib repo lib repo
t t july julyi i i i− − −  
 
2. Medium term lending risk 
,3 ,1( )repo repot ti i−  
 
0 1.196t
tx
ω∂
=
∂
 and 
1 0t
tx
ω∂
=
∂
 
 
so 
 
,3 ,1
1
1
1.196( )
( )
t
repo repo
t t t
diff
i i
ρ
ρ
ω
∂ −
= +
∂ −  
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so change due to changes in medium term lending risk is    
 
1.196
1
1
( )
t
ρ
ρ
ω
−
+ ,3 ,1 ,3 ,1
2007 2007{( ) ( )}
repo repo repo repo
t t july julyi i i i− − −  
 
3. Liquidity (
FSR
tliq ) 
 
0 0.804t
tx
ω∂
= −
∂
 and 
1 0.171t
tx
ω∂
=
∂
 
 
so 
 
1 1
1
0.804( ) 0.171
base
t t
FSR
t t t
diff i
liq
ρ
ρ
ω ω
∂ −
= − + +
∂
 
 
so change due to changes in liquidity is    
 
{
1 1
1
0.804( ) 0.171
base
t
t t
iρ
ρ
ω ω
−
− + + } 2007( )
FSR FSR
t julyliq liq−  
 
The two effects of liquidity in A7) go in opposite directions as the reduction in 
liquidity will: 
 
• increase 0tω  and thus widen the differential 
 
• reduce 1tω  and thus reduce the differential 
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Table 1) 
  Main Estimates 
 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) 
Eqns estimated (7) and (10) (11)-(12) (13)-(14) (15)-(16) (17)-(18) 
 1996M1-
2008M2 
1996M1-
2008M2 
1996M1-
2008M2 
1992M10-
2008M2 
2000M12-
2008M2 
 Policy rule      
ρ     0.900 
(0.040) 
  0.894 
(0.030) 
  0.911 
(0.042) 
 0.891 
(0.041) 
 0.901 
(0.012) 
r    1.109 
(0.174) 
  3.076 
(0.056) 
  3.053 
(0.057) 
 2.466 
(0.161) 
-0.672 
(0.129) 
piφ  (inflation)   1.130 
(0.161) 
  1.572 
(0.173) 
  1.628 
(0.150) 
 1.537 
(0.128) 
 0.567 
(0.085) 
yφ  (output gap)   2.276 
(0.136) 
  2.780 
(0.173) 
  2.524 
(0.137) 
 1.721 
(0.116) 
 1.942 
(0.107) 
Regression 
standard error  
  0.15   0.17   0.17   0.17    0.10 
2R     0.98   0.97   0.97   0.98    0.97 
Parameter 
stability (p-value) 
  0.27   0.00   0.00   0.28    0.11 
       
 Libor 
equation 
     
00ω  
  0.159 (0.024)  -0.150 
(0.011) 
  0.120 
(0.009) 
 0.080 
(0.039) 
  0.321 
(0.016) 
01ω  (unsecured 
lending risk) 
  1.688 
(0.087) 
  1.689 
(0.063) 
    1.677 
(0.045) 
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02ω  (medium term 
risk) 
  1.196 
(0.080) 
  1.102 
(0.060) 
   -0.535 
(0.067) 
03ω  (liquidity)  -0.804 
(0.103) 
  0.130 
(0.014) 
 -1.162 
(0.139) 
 -0.963 
(0.059) 
04ω  (corporate 
risk) 
    0.221 
(0.039)  
 
11ω    0.950 
(0.005) 
   0.988 
(0.005) 
  0.913 
(0.003) 
12ω  (liquidity)   0.171 
(0.020) 
   0.236 
(0.027) 
  0.206 
(0.012) 
Regression 
standard error  
  0.14   0.18   0.19  0.18   0.09 
2R    0.98   0.97   0.97  0.98   0.98 
Parameter 
stability (p-value) 
  0.17   0.00   0.00  0.14   0.12 
Simplify to (13)-
(14) (p-value) 
  0.00    0.00 0.00 
Simplify to (11)-
(12) (p-value) 
  0.00    0.00 0.00 
      
Notes:  
(i) Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Parameter stability is an 
F test of parameter stability (see Lin and Teräsvirta, 1994). 
(ii) “Simplify to (13)-(14) reports the p values from tests of the hypotheses 
0 0 1 0 2 0 3 1 2: 0H ω ω ω ω= = = = for columns (i) and (v) and 
0 0 1 0 4 1 2: 0H ω ω ω= = =  for column (iv) 
(iii) “Simplify to (11)-(12) reports the p values from tests of the hypotheses 
0 11 12: 1; 0H ω ω= =  
 
 26 
 
References 
Amihud, Y. (2002). Illiquidity and stock returns: cross-section and time series 
effects, Journal of Financial Markets, 5, 31–56.  
 
Ang, A. and M. Piazzesi (2003). A No-Arbitrage Vector Autoregression of 
Term Structure Dynamics with Macroeconomic and Latent Variables, Journal 
of Monetary Economics, 50, 745-787. 
 
Bank of England (2007). Financial Stability Report, April 2007. 
 
Banque de France (2008), Financial Stability Review, Special Issue on 
Liquidity. 
 
Giavazzi, F. (2008). Why does the spread between LIBOR and expected 
future policy rates persist, and should central banks do something about it?  
Available at: 
http://www.igier.uni-bocconi.it/whos.php?vedi=1046&tbn=albero&id_doc=177 
 
Kyle, A. (1985). Continuous auctions and insider trading, Econometrica, 53, 
1315–35. 
 
Lomax, R. (2007). Current Monetary Policy Issues. Speech to Hull & Humber 
Chamber of Commerce, at KC Football Stadium, Hull, 22 November 2007.  
Available at: 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2007/speech329.pdf 
 
Lin, C-F.J. and Teräsvirta, T. (1994). Testing the constancy of regression 
parameters against continuous structural change, Journal of Econometrics, 
62, 211-228. 
 
Michaud, F.-L. and C. Upper (2008). What drives interbank rates? Evidence 
from the Libor panel. Bank for International Settlements Quarterly Review, 47-
58.  
 27 
 
Piazessi, M. (2005). Bond Yields and the Federal Reserve, Journal of Political 
Economy, 113, 311-344. 
 
Smith, D. (2007). A Lower Bank Rate for the Medium-Term?. Available at: 
http://www.economicsuk.com/blog/000601.html 
 
Svensson, L.E.O. (1997). “Inflation Forecast Targeting: Implementing and 
Monitoring Inflation Targets.” European Economic Review, 41, 1111–1146. 
 
Taylor, J.B. and J.C. Williams (2008). A Black Swan in the Money Market. 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper 2008-04. Available at: 
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/papers/2008/wp08-04bk.pdf 
 
 28 
 
 Figure 1: Interest rate spreads, liquidity, inflation and output gap in the 
UK 
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Figure 2: Counterfactual Experiment 
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Figure 3: Time-varying inflation and output gap effects 
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Note: Figure 3 plots the time-varying inflation effect (
11 12
FSR
tliq
piφ
ω ω+
) and the 
time-varying output gap effect (
11 12
y
FSR
tliq
φ
ω ω+
) using estimates of equation 
(10) reported in Table 1. 
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Figure 4: Decomposing the differential between the 3-month Libor rate and 
base rate 
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Note: The decomposition is based on the estimates of equations (7) and (10) 
reported in Table 1. 
 
